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Abstract
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is commonly observed, both in ethnographic and empirical studies, that the behavior of individual
a g e n t si sa ﬀected by that of their peers. This is particularly true in education, crime, labor markets,
fertility, participation to welfare programs, etc.1 The detection and measure of such peer eﬀects
is, however, a very diﬃcult exercise. Two main assumptions, not always made explicit, usually
accompany this detection and measure. First, peer eﬀects are conceived as an average intra-group
externality that aﬀects identically all the members of a given group. Second, the group boundaries
f o rs u c ha nh o m o g e n e o u se ﬀect are often arbitrary, and at a quite aggregate level, in part due to
the constraints imposed by the available disaggregated data. For instance, peer eﬀects in crime
are often measured at the neighborhood level using local crime rates, peer eﬀects in school at the
classroom or school level using average school achievements, etc.
In this paper, we propose a theoretical model for peer eﬀects that builds on the smallest unit of
analysis for this cross inﬂuence, the dyad. The collection of dyadic bilateral relationships constitutes
a social network, and our model relates analytically equilibrium behavior to network location. Using
a unique dataset of friendship networks from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health
(AddHealth), we then test the empirical salience of our model predictions. We ﬁnd that a standard
deviation increase in our equilibrium measure of network location accounts for a 45% standard
deviation increase in individual delinquency, and a 34% standard deviation increase in pupil school
performance.
In what follows, we ﬁrst describe the theoretical model of peer eﬀects, and then the empirical
measure stemming from our theoretical analysis.
Our model starts from a simple premise: peer eﬀects aggregate at the group level the collection of
bilateral cross inﬂuences the members of this group may or may not exert on each other. Consistent
with this approach, the smallest unit of analysis for peer eﬀects is the dyad, a two-person group. The
collection of active bilateral inﬂuences or dyads constitutes a social network. In this network, each
player chooses an optimal level of activity. Individual payoﬀs then result from the combination of
two eﬀects. First, an idiosyncratic component, that decreases marginally in own activity. Second,
a peer component, where each agent reaps complementarities from all her dyad partners in the
network.
An isolated agent without any dyad partner simply optimizes the idiosyncratic component of
her payoﬀ function. This is a single-agent optimal decision problem, with a well-deﬁned maximum.
Consider now an agent who belongs to a network of peer inﬂuences. For network connected
agents, payoﬀs are interdependent. We compute the Nash equilibrium of this peer eﬀect game
when agents choose their levels of activity simultaneously. At the Nash equilibrium, because of
the network complementarities, agents exhaust the marginal returns from their own action above
the optimal level of activity for an isolated agent. The actual equilibrium upward shift from this
1Durlauf (2004) oﬀers an exhaustive and critical survey.
2benchmark value depends, for each agent, on the amount of complementarities accessible to her.
Given that complementarities are rooted in direct friendship ties, equilibrium decisions generally
diﬀer across agents, and in a manner that reﬂects the existing heterogeneity in friendship ties. This
heterogeneity in friendship ties reﬂects diﬀerences in group exposure across agents, that translate
into a population distribution of peer eﬀects. At equilibrium, the group does not exert an average
externality common to all group members. Rather, the location of each group member in the
network of dyadic inﬂuences shapes the strength of the exerted upon externality.2
The sociology literature abounds in network measures that assign to each node in a network
ad i ﬀerent number that quantiﬁes the geometric intricacies of the sub-network surrounding that
particular node (Wasserman and Faust, 2004). It turns out from our theoretical analysis that one
(and only one) of such network measures captures exactly how each agent subsumes at equilibrium
the network payoﬀ complementarities. This is the Bonacich network centrality, due to Philip
Bonacich (1989). For a given network, the Bonacich network centrality counts, for each agent, the
total number of direct and indirect paths of any length in the network stemming from this agent.
Such paths are weighted by a geometrically decaying factor (with path length). Therefore, the
Bonacich centrality is not parameter free. It depends both on the network topology and on the
value of this decaying factor. This has important implications for the empirical analysis that we
discuss later.
Our main theoretical result establishes that the peer-eﬀect game has a unique Nash equilibrium
in which each agent strategy is proportional to her Bonacich centrality measure. We provide a
closed-form expression for this Bonacich-Nash linkage. Furthermore, we show that this equilibrium
is in pure strategies and always interior. This Bonacich-Nash linkage holds under a condition that
involves the network eigenvalues. This condition guarantees that the level of network complemen-
tarities are low enough compared to own-concavity. Under this condition, which is reminiscent but
far less demanding that standard dominance diagonal conditions in industrial organization, payoﬀ
functions are enough ‘concave’ so that interiority (and uniqueness) are obtained.3
One may wonder why the exact mapping between network location and equilibrium outcome is
more intricate than simply counting direct network links, and also requires to account for weighted
indirect network links. Recall, indeed, that the payoﬀ interdependence is such that each agent
only cares about the behavior of her direct dyad partners. At equilibrium, though, each agent has
to anticipate the actual behavior of her dyad partners to take on an optimal action herself. For
this reason, every dyad exerts a strategic externality on overlapping dyads, and the equilibrium
2Calvó-Armengol and Jackson (2004) describe a network model of information exchange, which opens the black-
box of peer eﬀects in drop-out decisions that vary at equilibrium with network location. Ballester et al. (2005)
provide an exhaustive analysis of a general version of the peer eﬀects game that we discuss here (the case of pure
substituability with corner solutions is analyzed in Bramoulle and Kranton, 2005). For literature surveys, see Jackson
(2005) on the growing literature on the economics of social networks, and Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004) on
job information networks.
3This unique equilibrium is also stable, and thus would naturally emerge from a tatônnement process.
3eﬀort levels of each agent must reﬂect this externality. As a matter of fact, the Bonacich centrality
captures adequately how these dyads overlap boils down to an equilibrium (ﬁxed point) pattern
of decisions. At equilibrium, individual decisions emanate from all the existing network chains of
direct and indirect contacts stemming from each agent, which is a feature characteristic of Bonacich
centrality. The parameter that weights paths length has to do with the relative strength of the
payoﬀ complementarity compared to own concavity.
That Nash equilibrium behavior can be exactly described by a network measure is very conve-
nient. For instance, the Nash-Bonacich linkage has important implications both for comparative
statics and for optimal networkp o l i c yd e s i g n( B a l l e s t e ret al. 2005). Here, we explore its empirical
validity.
We test the predictions of our peer-eﬀect model by using a very detailed and unique dataset
of friendship networks in the United States from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent
Health (AddHealth). We explore the role of network location for two diﬀerent outcomes in which
peer eﬀects matter: crime and education. Clearly, a number of empirical issues stemming from en-
dogenous network formation, unobserved individual, school and network heterogeneity might aﬀect
our estimation results. The richness of the information provided by the AddHealth data and the
use of both within and between network variations allow us to attempt to control for these empir-
ical issues. In particular, the available questions of the AddHealth questionnaire on adolescents’
behavior allow us to use observable variables to proxy for unobservable individual heterogeneity
(i.e. leadership propensity and ability); the large number of individuals in the survey provides us
with enough degrees of freedom to incorporate in the estimation at least school speciﬁc dummies,
and the large number of networks allows us to use a (pseudo) panel data model speciﬁcation in
order to purge the results from unobservable network-speciﬁc (constant across individuals in the
same network) eﬀects. Finally, our theoretically driven measure of peers’ outcome, which restricts
peer inﬂuence to interaction with direct friends only, eases oﬀ endogeneity issues arising from en-
dogenous network formation. We obtain a clear empirical result: the position of each individual in
a network plays an important role in shaping individual behavior.
More precisely, we explore the explanatory power of the Bonacich network centrality on ado-
lescents’ delinquency and school performance. For crime, we construct an index of delinquency
involvement based on self-reported adolescents’ responses to a set of questions describing partici-
pation in diﬀerent criminal activities (15 delinquency items). For education, we construct a school
performance index using detailed information on the grade achieved by each student in mathemat-
ics, history and social studies and science.
AddHealth contains rich information on friendship networks, which allows us to construct these
crime and education indices. Using the in-school friendship nominations data, we obtain a sample
of 5,154 criminals distributed over 116 networks, and a sample of 11,964 pupils distributed over 199
networks. Here, we refer to networks as maximally connected components. Within such networks,
4any agent is directly or indirectly linked to any other one. Across such networks, no network link
exists for no pair of agents. For all such networks, we know exactly who is directly linked to whom.
However, the strength of dyadic inﬂuences within each network is not readily available in Ad-
dHealth. Recall that these parameters enter the calculation of the Bonacich centralities, and cor-
respond to the decaying weights for path length. Using the within network variations, we estimate
one diﬀerent value for the dyadic interaction strength for each network. This estimation uses the
ﬁrst-order conditions of our peer-eﬀect game. Our ﬁndings show that the values for the dyadic
interaction strength vary widely across networks with their macro topological characteristics. We
ﬁnd a stronger local eﬀect in moderately dense networks with a highly skewed connectivity distrib-
ution and a high level of clustering, a characteristic displayed by many real-life networks (Jackson
and Rogers, 2004).
The estimated eﬀects of the dyadic interaction strength for the diﬀerent networks are then used
to calculate the individual Bonacich centrality measures of each agent in each network, and to
evaluate the impact of this measure on individual outcomes both in education and crime. The
Bonacich centrality values we obtain display both within and across network variation. The within
network variation is driven by the (potential) structural asymmetry of node locations in each
network. The between network variation is driven by the diﬀerences in dyadic strength across
diﬀerent networks.
The last stage of our empirical analysis consists in regressing individuals’ crime and education
outcomes on their corresponding Bonacich network centrality measures and a set of controls. Recall,
though, that our theoretical result on the Nash-Bonacich linkage is obtained under some eigenvalue
condition on the parameters of the interaction. For the crime data set, there are 28 networks that
fail to satisfy this eigenvalue condition (roughly the 24% of the total). Discarding these networks,
with a total of 906 people, we are left with a ﬁnal sample of 4,248 individuals distributed over
88 networks. For the education data set, there are 53 networks that fail to satisfy this condition
(roughly the 27% of the total), with a total number of 1,414 discarded people. We get a ﬁnal
sample of 10,550 individuals distributed over 146 networks.
Our estimation results produce a signiﬁcant estimate of the network location eﬀect, that ac-
counts, respectively, for nearly one half and one third of the variability in crime and education
outcomes.
In economics, the inﬂuence of peers on individual behavior has been extensively studied. The
novelty in our work in threefold. First, from a conceptual point of view, we stress the role of the
structure of social networks in explaining individual behavior. Second, from a more operational
point of view, we build a theoretical model of peer eﬀects that envisions group inﬂuence as an
equilibrium outcome by aggregating the collection of active dyadic peer inﬂuences. The analysis
of such model wedges a bridge between the economics literature, here Nash equilibrium, and the
sociology literature, here Bonacich centrality. Third, we conduct an empirical test of our model on
5the network structure of peer eﬀects using a unique dataset of friendship networks.
In sociology, it has long been recognized that not only friends but also the structure of friendship
t i e sa r ead e t e r m i n a n to fi n d i v i d u a lb e h a v i o r . T h en o v e l t y ,h e r e ,l i e si nt h ef a c tt h a tw em o d e l
explicitly individual incentives as tailored by the network of relationships, and conduct a full-ﬂedged
equilibrium analysis that relates topology to outcome. This equilibrium analysis then guides our
empirical analysis. In particular, it singles out the Bonacich network centrality as the adequate
topological index to explain outcomes. Besides, our analysis calls for exploiting both within and
between network variations to explain behavior.
2 A network model of peer eﬀects
2.1 The model
We develop a network model of peer eﬀects, where the network reﬂects the collection of active
bilateral inﬂuences.
The network N = {1,...,n} is a ﬁnite set of agents. We keep track of social connections
by a network g,w h e r egij =1if i and j are direct friends, and gij =0 , otherwise. Given that
friendship is a reciprocal relationship, we set gij = gji.W ea l s os e tgii =0 .
Preferences Each agent i selects an eﬀort yi ≥ 0, and obtains a payoﬀ ui(y,g) that depends









where a,c,d > 0.B i l a t e r a li n ﬂuences are captured by the following cross derivatives, for i 6= j:
∂2ui(y,g)
∂yi∂yj
= dgij ≥ 0. (2)
When i and j are direct friends, the cross derivative is d>0 and reﬂects a strategic complementarity
in eﬀorts. When i and j are not direct friends, this cross derivative is zero.
Note that the utility (1) is concave in own decisions, and displays decreasing marginal returns
in own eﬀort levels.
When agents wander in isolation and g is the empty network, all agents choose the same optimal
eﬀort a/c. Otherwise, agents’ equilibrium eﬀorts depend on the pattern of bilateral inﬂuences
reﬂected in g, and on the intensity of such bilateral inﬂuences, captured by d.
For instance, let n =2and g12 = g21 =1 .W h e n c<1, the equilibrium eﬀort in the dyad is
y∗
i = a/c(1 − d) >a / c . Each agents reaps complementarities from her dyad partner, and chooses
an eﬀort level above the optimal value for an isolated agent.
6More generally, local complementarities across directly linked agents in (2) exhaust marginal
returns in (1) above the single agent optimum a/c. The actual equilibrium upward shift from
this benchmark value a/c depends, for each agent, on the amount of complementarities accessible
to him. Given that complementarities are rooted in direct friendship ties, having more friends
increases one’s eﬀort decision at equilibrium. Equilibrium eﬀort levels thus generally diﬀer across
agents, in a manner that reﬂects the existing heterogeneity in friendship ties.
The exact mapping between network location and equilibrium outcome, though, is more intricate
than simply counting direct network links.
Consider for instance the following network with three agents.
ttt
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Figure 1. Three agents on a line.
This network results from the overlap between two diﬀerent dyads with a common partner,
agent 1. Agent 2 rips direct complementarities from agent 1 in one dyad whom, in turn, reaps
direct complementarities from agents 2 and 3 in both dyads. Thus, through the interaction with
the central agent, peripheral agents end up reaping complementarities indirectly from each other.
For this reason, the equilibrium decisions in each dyad cannot be analyzed independently of each
other. Rather, each dyad exerts a strategic externality on the other one, and the equilibrium eﬀort
level of each agent reﬂects this externality, and the role each agent may play as a driver for the
externality.
In what follows, we describe a network centrality measure that turns out to capture exactly
how each agent subsumes these strategic externalities across dyads as a function of the location he
holds in the network resulting from the dyads’ overlap.
2.2 Analysis of the model
W eb e g i nb yd e ﬁning a network centrality measure due to Bonacich (1989) that proves fruitful to
describe the equilibrium of the peer network model.
The network Bonacich centrality To each network g, we associate its adjacency matrix G
=[ gij]. This is a symmetric zero-diagonal square matrix that keeps track of the direct connections
in g.
The kth power Gk = G(kt i m e s ) ... G of the adjacency matrix G keeps track of indirect connections
in g. More precisely, the coeﬃcient g
[k]
ij in the (i,j) cell of Gk gives the number of paths of length
k in g between i and j. Note that, by deﬁnition, a path between i and j needs not to follow the
shortest possible route between those agents. For instance, when gij =1 ,t h es e q u e n c eij → ji → ij
constitutes a path of length three in g between i and j.








This is the sum of all paths of length k in g starting from i.






This is the sum of all paths in g starting from i, where paths of length k are weighted by the
geometrically decaying factor φk.N o t et h a t ,f o rφ small enough, this inﬁnite sum takes on a ﬁnite




φkGk · 1 =[ I−φG]
−1 · 1, (3)
where 1 is the vector of ones.
b(g,φ) coincides with the vector of network centrality of parameter φ in g ﬁrst introduced by
Bonacich (1987) in sociology. To each agent, it associates a value that counts the total number of
direct and indirect (weighted) paths in the network stemming from this agent. We refer to bi(g,φ)
as the Bonacich centrality of agent i in g.































For instance, we deduce from G3 that there are exactly two paths of length three between agents 1
and 2, which are 12 → 21 → 12 and 12 → 23 → 32. The former path is restricted to the 1-2 dyad,
whereas the latter path derives from the dyad overlap and is part of the across-dyads strategic
externality.






















Not surprisingly, agent 1 is more central than agents 2 and 3 and, the more so, the higher φ.
8Nash equilibrium We now characterize the Nash equilibrium of the game where agents
choose their eﬀort level yi ≥ 0 simultaneously. When local network complementarities do not oﬀset
own decreasing marginal returns, the Nash equilibrium eﬀort decision of each agent is uniquely
deﬁned and proportional to her Bonacich network centrality. In other words, Bonacich centrality
maps exactly ex ante heterogeneity in network locations into ex post heterogeneity in equilibrium
outcomes.
Denote by µ1(G) the largest eigenvalue of G.
Proposition 1 If dµ1(G) <c ,t h ep e e re ﬀect game with payoﬀs (1) has a unique Nash equilibrium











Proof. From Theorem 1 in Ballester et al. (2005).
The condition dµ1(G) <cstipulates that local complementarities must be small enough than
own concavity, which prevents multiple equilibria to emerge and, in the same time, rules out corner
solutions.
Network complementarities are measured by the compound index dµ1(G),w h e r ed refers to the
intensity of each non-zero cross eﬀect, whereas µ1(G) refers to the pattern of such cross eﬀects. The
largest eigenvalue increases with link addition, so that G0 ≥ G implies µ1(G0) ≥ µ1(G). Therefore,
the denser the network of local complementarities, the more stringent the condition in Proposition
1. The highest value for the largest eigenvalue is obtained for the complete network, where every
agent is directly linked to every other agent, and is equal to n − 1.As u ﬃcient condition for the
Nash-Bonacich linkage of Proposition 1 to hold is thus d(n − 1) <c .
Bonacich centrality is the right network index to account for equilibrium behavior. In (1), the
local payoﬀ interdependence is restricted to direct network mates. At equilibrium, though, this
local payoﬀ interdependence spreads all over the network through the overlap of direct friendship
clusters.4 Bonacich centrality precisely reﬂects how individual decisions feed into each other along
any direct and indirect network path.
Example 2. Consider the network g in Figure 1. The largest eigenvalue of its adjacency matrix
is equal to
√
2. Therefore, when d
√









The Nash equilibrium eﬀort level increases with group exposure, and is higher for the central agent
than for the peripheral ones. Also, the individual exposure to the group inﬂuence varies with
network location, and the Bonacich centrality captures the variance of peer eﬀects as a function of
structural location.
4At equilibrium, i’s eﬀort decision depends on j’s eﬀort decision, for all j such that gij =1 .B u tj’s eﬀort decision
depends, in turn, on k’s eﬀort decision, for all k such that gjk =1 . Therefore, i’s decision depends (indirectly) on k’s
decision, for all k such that g
[2]
ik =1 .A n ds oo n .
9Network peer eﬀects In this model, the structure of the social network and, in particular,
the individual positions in such network, are the main explanatory variables for agents’ behavior.
This is the Nash-Bonacich linkage. In the crime and education literatures, for instance, social
aspects as well as peer eﬀects have been emphasized as important drivers for individual conduct,5
but seldom from a network perspective.
The novelty of our model lies precisely on the fact that network structural properties become the
cornerstone for understanding the inﬂuence of peers on individual behavior. In the coming sections,
we investigate the empirical relevance of this issue. The empirical measure of peer eﬀects that is
derived from our model thus diﬀers substantially from previous work in this area.6 Indeed, we
are not looking at the impact of group peer eﬀects on individual’s activity in crime or education.
Instead, we consider the impact of the position of each individual in her network of peers (as
measured by her Bonacich centrality) on criminal and education outcomes.
3 Data and estimation issues
The aim of our empirical analysis is to explore to which extent the structural position of each indi-
vidual in a peer network, captured by her Bonacich centrality, accounts for her observed education
and crime outcomes. For this purpose, we use a unique data set that provides detailed information
on friendship networks within schools in the U.S., the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent
Health (AddHealth).
3.1 Empirical strategy
Guided by Proposition 1, we wish to measure the actual empirical relationship between bi (g,φ)
and the observed eﬀort level, y∗
i .
We consider two diﬀerent individual outcomes for y∗
i , which are: educational achievement and
criminal activity. As we discuss below, these are (almost) readily available items in the AddHealth
dataset.
To account for these individual outcomes, the main explanatory variable of interest is bi (g,φ),
the individual Bonacich centrality of agent i in the peer network g she belongs to. This explanatory
variable is not readily available in the AddHealth dataset. To construct it, we use a two-stage
procedure. The ﬁrst stage provides us with an estimation of φ. The second stage regresses y∗
i on
the estimated value of bi (g,φ).
First stage: estimation of φ We construct bi (g,φ) from two sources of information, the friend-
ship network g and the parameter φ, that measures the strength of the peer inﬂuence between any
5See, among others, Sah (1991), Glaeser et al. (1996), Silverman (2004), for crime, and Bartoleme (1990), Benabou
(1993), Epple and Romano (1998), for education. Akerlof (1997) provides a general discussion on these issues.
6See, for example, Topa (2001) for an example of an empirical measure of network eﬀects.
10t w of r i e n d si nan e t w o r k .
AddHealth contains rich information on friendship networks, from which we obtain g directly.
The details are discussed below. The value for φ, instead, is not readily available in the dataset.
The estimation of φ is one important aspect that distinguishes our work from previous studies in
this area.
Our estimation of φ uses the ﬁrst order conditions of our model of network peer eﬀects.
Assume that there are K network components in the economy. Network components are maxi-
mally connected networks, that satisfy the two following conditions. First, two agents in a network
component gκ are either directly linked, or are indirectly linked through a sequence of agents in
gκ. Second, two agents in diﬀerent network components gκ and gκ0 cannot be connected through
any such sequence.
Consider a network component gκ that connects nκ diﬀerent agents. Note that
PK
κ=1 nκ = n.
The preferences of agent i in the network gκ are given by (1). At equilibrium, each agent
maximizes her utility. The corresponding ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂ui,κ(yκ,gκ)
∂yi,κ




Therefore, for each network component indexed by κ =1 ,...,K,w eh a v e :




where φκ = dκ/cκ and ακ = aκ/cκ.
The empirical equivalent of this equation is:
yi,κ = ακ + φκ
nκ X
j=1
gij,κyj,κ + υi,κ,f o r i =1 ,...,n κ ; κ =1 ,...,K. (5)
where yi,κ is the individual i0s level of activity (educational achievement or criminal activity) in
the network component k.




i,κ,w h e r exm
i,κ is a set of M control variables
accounting for individual, network, family, school and residential neighborhood characteristics, and
υi,k is an error term. The network level controls are all local aggregates, that is, aggregates of the
control variables among direct friends in the network, which provide individual level variation. A
precise description of all the variables used both for educational achievement and criminal activity
are contained in Appendix 1.
We obtain nκ diﬀerent equations for each network gκ. We estimate one value of φκ for each
such network. This estimation is obtained by OLS on the pool of all agents, n = n1 + ... +
nK. We use a model speciﬁcation containing interaction terms between network dummies and
individuals’ local aggregates. The error term is assumed to be uncorrelated across networks, but
11not necessarily within network. Standard errors are adjusted for within network heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation.
We obtain K diﬀerent estimates b φ1,...,b φK for the strength of local interactions, one value for
each network.
Second stage: regression on Bonacich The estimated eﬀects of local interactions in the
diﬀerent networks, b φ1,...,b φK, are then used to calculate the individual Bonacich centrality measures.
O b s e r v et h a tt h eﬁrst stage estimation gives rise to an estimated value b φκ of φκ for each network
component gκ.V a r i a t i o n so fb φk are thus only between network components. These values are then
used to obtain bi,κ(gκ,b φκ), the estimated Bonacich measures of each agent i in each network gκ.
These measures vary across agents and both within and between network components. The within-
network component variation is driven by gκ, that is, the (potential) structural asymmetry of node
locations in gκ. The between-network components variation is driven by b φκ and its diﬀerences in
values across diﬀerent networks. The aim of the second stage of our empirical strategy is to evaluate
the impact of the Bonacich measure on individual outcomes both in education and crime.
In accordance with Proposition 1, we estimate the following model:
yi,κ = α0
κ + βb i,κ(gκ,b φκ)+υ0
i,κ,f o r i =1 ,...,n κ ; κ =1 ,...,K. (6)
Here, α0
k is a set of control variables including a selection of variables considered in (5) and υ0
i,κ
denotes an error term. To account for unobserved network eﬀects, we use a speciﬁcation of the
model with a network speciﬁc component of the error term.
A (pseudo) panel data ﬁxed eﬀects estimator is adopted. The estimated value b β of β measures
the empirical impact of network location on education and criminal outcomes. Proposition 1 is
empirically validated whenever b β is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The value of b β then measures
the exact predictive role of structural network positioning for outcomes.
3.2 Estimation issues
We discuss separately the main estimation issues arising at each of our two-stage procedure.
First-stage estimation We use the observed (estimated) level of local social interactions to
test the role of the network geometry in shaping individual outcomes, once networks are formed.
We estimate φκ from the ﬁrst order conditions. At ﬁrst sight, this estimation strategy seems to
require that the overall network level of education/crime has to be taken as an exogenous variable
with respect to each network member’s level of activity. This assumption is, of course, hard to
believe, all the more in a model of social interactions.
Here, though, this assumption is less stringent because the peer inﬂuence we consider is re-
stricted to interactions with direct friends. For this reason, the regressor used in equation (5)
12considers (only) local aggregate levels of education/crime, instead of the global network level.7
However, to exclude the possibility that the endogeneity of network membership decisions may
cause some unobservable group heterogeneity that could aﬀect our results, we address explicitly
this issue in our empirical analysis.8 More precisely, we test for the exogeneity of the local aggregate
levels of education/crime with respect to individual levels by instrumenting the local aggregates
with their deviations from the network component average.
Formally, denote the local aggregates by e yi,κ =
Pnκ
j=1 gij,κyj,κ,i . e .t h es u mo fe ﬀort levels of all














The instruments correspond to deviations from the average. Here, ∆yi,κ = e yi,κ − yκ,f o ri =
1,...,n κ; κ =1 ,...,K.
By construction, these instruments are correlated with e yi,κ but have zero average over each






∆yi,κ =0 ,f o r κ =1 ,...,K.
We use a simple two-step instrumental variable methodology (procedure described in Wooldridge,
2002, p. 474). This procedure consists on estimating an augmented version of model (5):9
yi,κ = ρκb εi,κ + φκe yi,κ + υi,κ,f o r i =1 ,...,n κ,
where the b εi,κ are the estimated residuals of a regression of e yi,κ on the set of exogenous variables in
model (5) and the instruments ∆yi,κ. Using the standard t-test, a failure to reject the hypothesis
H0 : ρκ =0indicates that e yi,κ can be taken as exogenous variable. In our case, we obtain a t-test
statistic for ρk equal to 1.31 and 1.22 for education and crime, respectively. Thus, endogeneity
issues do not seem to be a major concern for our analysis.
Second-stage estimation In the second-stage estimation, a function of the b φκs estimated in
(5) enters as regressor in (6).10 Therefore, this two-stage procedure produces consistent estimates
7Note that AddHealth provides us with such an impressive amount of information about individuals and friends,
that problems of unobserved individual and group eﬀects are less likely to arise.
8Beyond network endogeneity, correlated unobservables may arise for other reasons, such as errors-in-variables or
contextual variables. See Moﬃtt (2001) for more details.
9Throughout this section, while discussing various versions of models (5) and (6), we drop the set of control
variable in their speciﬁcations for ease of exposition.
10Note that alternative empirical strategies have also been adopted. For instance, a one-step estimation procedure
involving non-linear least squares produces a similar estimate of β. We choose to report this two-step strategy because
it allows us to deal adequately with unobserved network eﬀects that might be relevant in our context.
13of β in model (6) provided that υi,κ and υ0
i,κ are not correlated. If these were so, a correct two-
stage estimation only requires a correction of the second stage variance-covariance matrix (see
Wooldridge, 2002, p. 116).
Given the tested exogeneity of e yi,κ with respect to υi,κ, one may reasonably assume straightaway
that υi,κ and υ0
i,κ are, indeed, uncorrelated.
However, one might argue that there may be still some unobserved eﬀects stemming from the
individual-network match, which may cause correlation between υi,κ and υ0
i,κ. In order to increase
our conﬁdence in our estimation results, we control for this issue in our empirical analysis. This
reasoning translates into an error-component version of model (6) with unobserved network eﬀects:
yi,κ = ηκ + βb i,κ(gκ,b φκ)+µi,κ,f o r i =1 ,...,n; κ =1 ,...,K,
where the disturbance term consists on a network speciﬁcc o m p o n e n tηκ, constant over individuals
in the same network and correlated with the regressors, and a white noise component, µi,κ.
For network gκ, the resulting model can then be written as:
yκ = β bκ(gκ,b φκ)+ηκ1κ + µκ, (7)
where variables in bold are vectors of dimension nκ and 1κ is a vector of ones of same dimension.
When the number of networks is large and there is a ﬁx number of individuals within each
network, a pseudo panel data ﬁxed eﬀects estimator can be used to eliminate ηκ from model
(7), thus obtaining consistent estimates of β. Provided that the ﬁxed eﬀects transformation of the
variables (i.e. deviations form the group mean) is conducted within each network, diﬀerent network
sizes (i.e. diﬀerent nκs) are not a matter of concern.
3.3 Data and deﬁnition of the dependent variables
Our analysis is made possible by the use of a unique database on friendship networks from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (AddHealth).
The AddHealth database has been designed to study the impact of the social environment
(i.e. friends, family, neighborhood and school) on adolescents’ behavior in the United States by
collecting data on students in grades 7-12 from a nationally representative sample of roughly 130
private and public schools in years 1994-95.
Every pupil attending the sampled schools on the interview-day is asked to compile a brief
questionnaire (in-school data) containing questions on respondents’ demographic and behavioral
characteristics, education, family background and friendship. The AddHealth website describes
surveys and data in details.11 This sample contains information on 90,118 students.
In a second phase of the survey, a subset of adolescents selected from the rosters of the sampled
schools is then asked to compile a longer questionnaire containing more sensitive individual and
11http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth
14household information (in-home and parental data). This sample contains information on 20,745
students.
Friendship networks AddHealth contains unique detailed information on friendship rela-
tionships. This information proves crucial for our analysis. The friendship information is based
upon actual friends nominations. Pupils were asked to identify their best friends from a school
roster (up to ﬁve males and ﬁve females). By matching the identiﬁcation numbers of the friendship
nominations to respondents’ identiﬁcation numbers, one can obtain information on the characteris-
tics of nominated friends. Very importantly, one can also reconstruct the whole geometric structure
of the friendship network.
For each school, we obtain all the network components of (best) friends.12 Note that, when an
individual i identiﬁes a best friend j who does not belong to the same school, the database does
not include j in the network of i; it provides no information about j. Fortunately, in the majority
of cases, best friends tend to be in the same school and thus are systematically included in the
network. We obtain over two hundred diﬀerent networks.
We now discuss the data on crime and education.
Criminal activity The in-home questionnaire contains an extensive set of questions on prop-
erty and violent delinquency, that are used to construct our dependent variable.
By merging the in-school friendship nominations data to the in-home data and by excluding the
individuals that report never participating in any delinquent activity (roughly 40% of the total),
we obtain a ﬁnal sample of 5,154 criminals distributed over 116 networks.
The individual level of criminal activity is measured adopting the standard approach in the
sociological literature, which uses an index of delinquency involvement based on self-reported ado-
lescents’ responses to a set of questions describing participation in a series of criminal activity.
The AddHealth contains information on 15 delinquency items.13 The survey asks students how
often they participate in each of these activities during the past year. Each response is coded
using an ordinal scale ranging from 0 (i.e. never participate) to 1 (i.e. participate 1 or 2 times),
2 (participate 3 or 4 times) up to 3 (i.e. participate 5 or more times). On the basis on these
scores, a summated index is calculated for each respondent. The mean is 1.57, with considerable
12Thus, in a network component, a link exists between two friends if at least one of the two individuals has identiﬁed
the other as his/her best friend.
13Namely, paint graﬃti or signs on someone else’s property or in a public place; deliberately damage property
that didn’t belong to you; lie to your parents or guardians about where you had been or whom you were with; take
something from a store without paying for it; get into a serious physical ﬁght; hurt someone badly enough to need
bandages or care from a doctor or nurse; run away from home; drive a car without its owner’s permission; steal
something worth more than $50; go into a house or building to steal something; use or threaten to use a weapon to
get something from someone; sell marijuana or other drugs; steal something worth less than $50; take part in a ﬁght
where a group of your friends was against another group; act loud, rowdy, or unruly in a public place.
15variation around this value (the standard deviation is equal to 1.73). The Crombach−α measure
is then used to assess the quality of the derived variable. In our case, we obtain an α equal to
0.80 (0 ≤ α ≤ 1) indicating that the 15 diﬀerent items incorporated in the index have considerable
internal consistency. Because we focus our attention only on networks of criminals (i.e. we exclude
all respondent having 0 in all items), the distribution of the delinquency index is not far from
normal, causing no substantial concerns in the use of the OLS estimation method.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the adolescents selected in our sample of criminals.
It reveals that, for instance, the average criminal adolescent is male, white, does not participate
regularly to religious services, has a very poor performance at school and a low motivation in
education, lives in a poor quality neighborhood and in a poorly kept building, spends a considerable
time hanging around with friends, attends a public school where the anti-crime regulations are not
so strict and does not feel that adults care very much about him/her. Almost 70% of the adolescents
live in households with two parents, but only in the 32% of the cases parents are married, and the
most recurrent parent occupation is manual.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Education achievements The in-home questionnaire contains detailed information on the
grade achieved by each student in mathematics, history and social studies and science, ranging
from D or lower to A, the highest grade (re-coded 1 to 4). On the bases on these scores, similarly
to the construction of the delinquency index, a school performance index is calculated for each
respondent. The mean is 2.34 and the standard deviation is equal to 2.11. Also in this case, the
distribution of the school performance index is not far from normal. The value of the Crombach-α,
which is equal to 0.86, points to the good quality of the derived indicator.
By merging the in-home data to the in-school friendship nominations data and by excluding
the individuals that report a non valid answer to the target questions (e.g. didn’t take this subject,
refused, don’t know), we obtain a ﬁnal sample of 11,964 pupils distributed over 199 networks.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the students selected in this sample. It reveals that,
for instance, the average student is in grade 9, has spent more than 3 years in the school, is
fairly motivated in education, with a good relationship with teachers, whose parents have a level
of education higher than high school degree and lives in a fairly well kept building. School and
teacher quality are about average and the 33% of students attends a private school. The variables
indicating the interaction with friends and parents show a high involvement in friends’ relations
and a high level of parental care.
[Insert Table 2 here]
164 Empirical results
4.1 Descriptive evidence
Figures 2a and 2b display the empirical distribution of network components by their size (i.e.
the number of network members) for all adolescents and for criminals, respectively.14 From these
ﬁgures, one can see that both distributions are roughly normal and that most friendship networks
have between 30 and 90 members (a little bit less for crime networks). In fact, the minimum number
of friends in a network component is 16 for education and 18 for crime, while the maximum is 107
for education and 84 for crime. For education, the average and the standard deviation of network






























Figure 2a. The empirical distribution of adolescent networks
14The histograms show on the horizontal axes the percentiles of the empirical distribution of network component
members corresponding to the percentages 1, 5, 10, 25, 50, 75, 90, 95, 100 and in the vertical axes the number of

























Figure 2b: The empirical distribution of criminal networks
Figure 3 depicts a friendship school network with 16 pupils from the education data set. It
is one of the smallest networks in our sample (both for the education and crime data). In this
network, the most connected student (number 9) has ten direct friends, and the least connected
students (numbers 1, 15 and 16) have only one direct friend. Not surprisingly, agent 9 has also
the highest Bonacich centrality measure (equal to 3.40) while agents 1, 15 and 16 have the lowest
one (equal to 1.28). This is a maximal network component, so that no student in the network has
nominated any student outside the network. The largest network in our sample is almost seven
times bigger and has 107 members.
18Figure 3. Smallest network of adolescents (n =1 6 )
4.2 Econometric results: ﬁrst-stage estimation
The estimated φks are all highly signiﬁc a n ta n di nt h er a n g e0.01−1.02 for crime, and 0.05−1.32
for education.
The average estimate of φ, which indicates the extent of social interactions, is equal to 0.58
(with standard deviation 0.59) for crime, and equal to 0.43 (with standard deviation 0.79)f o r
education. In terms of standard deviations, these peer eﬀects translate into roughly an average
20% increase in individual level of delinquency and an average 16% increase in school performance.
This is consistent with the empirical studies of social interactions and peer eﬀects in crime (see e.g.
Case and Katz, 1991, Glaeser et al., 1996, ) and education (see e.g. Evans et al., 1992, Sacerdote,
2001)
The estimated value b φκ measures the strength of each existing bilateral inﬂuence in the network
gκ. These estimated values, b φ1,...,b φK, vary widely across the K = 116 criminal networks and the
K = 199 school-peer networks. These diﬀerences are partly driven by the structural diﬀerences
across such networks, as we examine below.
Figures 4a-4c15 plot the estimated b φks( w i t hc o n ﬁdence bands) against three diﬀerent struc-
tural network measures.16 These measures are density (Figure 4a), asymmetry (Figure 4b) and
15Figures 4a-4c relate only to crime data. The education data leads to similar pictures. Thus these graphs are not
reported here. They are available upon request.
16The e φks are normalized to be between 0 and 1, divided in ten intervals and averaged over each interval. The
mean values in each interval are displayed on the horizontal axes, while the average structural properties of the
corresponding networks are reported on the vertical axes. The conﬁdence bands are based on the derived standard
errors of the average estimated levels of e φks in each interval, assuming independency of the e φks across the diﬀerent
networks.
19redundancy (Figure 4c). In Figure 4b and 4c, the b φks are divided by the network density.17
Network density is simply the fraction of all possible ties present in a network. It ranges from
0 to 1 as networks get denser. Network asymmetry is the ratio of the highest to the lowest node
connectivity in a network component. It is related to the variance of connectivities. We normalize
it, so that it reaches 1 for the most asymmetric network in the sample. Network redundancy is
the fraction of all transitive triads18 over the total number of triads. It measures the probability
with which two of i’s friends know each other. Redundancy, or clustering, is much higher in social

















Figure 4a: Density in crime networks
17These estimation results refers to the speciﬁcation of model (5) where a complete set of control variables has been
introduced. The inclusion of an increasing number of controls has the eﬀect of only slightly decreasing the extent
of the peers eﬀects, but they remain always signiﬁcant and qualitatively the same. The diﬀerent sets of controls are
a selection of the ones included in the second stage (Table 3) and they show roughly the same eﬀects. Thus, the
estimation results for all the other control variables of this ﬁrst stage are not reported here for ease of brevity.
18A triad is the subgraph on three individuals, so that when studying triads, one has to consider the threesome of
individuals and all the links between them. A triad involving individuals i,j,k is transitive if whenever i → j and
j → k,t h e ni → k.















































Figure 4c: Redundancy in crime networks
Figure 4a shows that the strength of bilateral inﬂuences increases steadily with network density
for low values, and remains roughly unchanged for higher values. Therefore, richer networks are a
sign of stronger dyadic cross eﬀects, at least until roughly 60% of all possible networks links are
created. Figure 4b shows that network asymmetry has a non-trivial impact on the intensity of
peer eﬀects. Highly distributed and symmetric networks are compatible with both very low and
21very high values of the peer-to-density ratio, while highly centralized and asymmetric networks
are always synonymous of an average value of peer eﬀects. Finally, Figure 4c shows that link
redundancy, or clustering, has a strong positive impact on the strength of bilateral inﬂuences above
a minimum threshold value.
Altogether, these ﬁgures suggest that peer eﬀects are strong in moderately dense networks
displaying a highly skewed connectivity distribution and a high level of clustering. This is, in fact,
the footprint of most real-life large scale social networks (Jackson and Rogers, 2004). Peer eﬀects
can also be strong in dense and distributed networks with high clustering. Instead, peer eﬀects are
always low in sparse and distributed networks with low clustering. High clustering, therefore, is a
necessary condition for strong peer eﬀects.
4.3 Econometric results: second-stage estimation
The Nash-Bonacich linkage in Proposition 1 holds when φµ1(g) < 1,w h e r eµ1(g) is the largest
eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix associated to g. For our empirical analysis, we thus discard all
those networks gκ for which the value of φκ obtained after the ﬁrst-stage estimation is higher than
the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of gκ.
For example, for the student network component in Figure 3, the estimated value for φ is 0.5
(with standard deviation 0.5010). The largest eigenvalue for this network is 7.15, and its inverse
is equal to 0.14. The Bonacich-Nash linkage thus holds for this network. The estimated values for
Bonacich range from 1.04 to 3.40. The Bonacich centrality for the least connected student is equal
to 1.2852. The least connected student does not coincide with the least central one. One student
with twice as much contacts than the least connected one is the least central in the group. Instead,
in this case, the most connected student is also the most central one.
For the crime data set, there are 28 networks that fail to satisfy the eigenvalue condition (roughly
the 24% of the total), with a total number of 906 discarded people. We are left with a ﬁnal sample
of 4,248 individuals distributed over 88 networks. For the education data set, there are 53 networks
that fail to satisfy this condition (roughly the 27% of the total), with a total number of 1,414
discarded people. We get a ﬁnal sample of 10,550 individuals distributed over 146 networks.
For these subsamples, we use the estimated b φκs to calculate the Bonacich measure biκ(gκ,b φκ)
for each individual i =1 ,...,n κ in each network κ =1 ,...,K. The Bonacich measures range between
1.09 and 4.79, with an average of 2.69 and a standard deviation of 2.05 for the crime data, and
between 1.02 and 5.91 with an average of 2.18 and a standard deviation of 2.58 for the education
data.20
The estimation of model (7), both with the crime and education data, has been performed
using diﬀerent model speciﬁcations where diﬀerent sets of controls have been added (see Appendix
20Note that the theory implies that the Bonacich measures have to be strictly greater than 1 (it is equal to 1 if
φ =0 ).
221). We start by including standard individuals’ characteristics and behavioral factors (i.e., socio-
demograﬁc factors, family background, motivation in education and a proxy for individual ability,
namely mathematics score). Then, we gradually introduce protective factors (i.e., relationship with
t e a c h e r s ,s o c i a le x c l u s i o n ,s c h o o la t t a c h m e n t ,p a r e ntal care), residential neighborhood characteris-
tics and school characteristics. We then include proxies aiming at capturing the quality of social
interactions: individual behavior towards friends in general and characteristics of local interactions,
related both to the individual behavior towards direct friends and to derived characteristics of direct
friends.
Finally, we also attempt to control for unobservable individual and school characteristics that
may be correlated with our variable of interest. Regarding criminal behavior, it is sensible to think
that probably more self-conﬁdent and more motivated individuals end up to be leaders, thus show-
ing a higher value of the Bonacich measure. If these individuals are also more likely to commit
crime, we then deal with unobservable individual characteristics that may cause criminal outcomes
not directly caused by the centrality measure. Technically, there may exist a positive correlation
between bi,k(gk,b φk) and υ0
i,k that biases OLS estimates upwards. To control for diﬀerences in
leadership propensity across criminals, we use a proxy of self esteem and the level of physical de-
velopment compared to the peers. Regarding students’ school performance, one might argue that
more able and thus more successful students are contacted by a larger number of friends. This also
might cause an upward bias in the OLS estimation results. Even though a proxy for individual
ability, namely mathematics score, is already included in the set of explanatory variables, we also
use the indicator of self-esteem in the education-peer association analysis as a further control for
individual unobservable characteristics because more able and thus more successful students are
likely to consider themselves as more intelligent than their peers. Similar reasonings apply for
possible correlations between our centrality measure and unobservable school characteristics aﬀect-
ing structure and/or quality of school-friendship networks in analyzing both criminal behavior and
school performance. Thus, we include school dummies to account for school-speciﬁc unobservable
eﬀects.21
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the ﬁnal speciﬁcation of model (7), which include a
complete set of controls, both for crime (column two) and education (column three). The estimated
eﬀects of the control variables are qualitatively the same across all model speciﬁcations and in line
with the expectations both in the crime and education results.22
[Insert Table 3 here]
The estimated eﬀects of our Bonacich centrality measure β in shaping criminal and educational
21The introduction of student-grade or student-year of attendance in the school dummies does not change qualita-
tively the results.
22The complete list of estimation results for all the variables across the diﬀerent model speciﬁcation, both for crime
and education, are available upon request.
23behavior (ﬁrst row in Table 3) are highly statistically signiﬁcant in all model speciﬁcations, both
in the crime and education regressions. These evidence indicates that, after accounting for the
eﬀects of an extensive set of observable individual characteristics and unobservable network speciﬁc
factors, the individual position in the network is key to determine the individual level of criminal
activity and school performance.
Regarding the magnitude of the eﬀect, the responsiveness of our dependent variable with respect
to the Bonacich centrality measure is considerable. A standard deviation increase in the Bonacich
measure raises the level of individual delinquency by roughly 45% of one standard deviation and the
level of student school performance by roughly 34% of one standard deviation. Bonacich centrality
thus accounts for nearly one half of the observed heterogeneity in criminal outcomes, and for one
third of the observed variability in educational achievements.
The analysis on the crime data has also been performed using as dependent variables the
diﬀerent types of criminal activities separately. The estimated impact of the Bonacich measure is
statistically signiﬁcant in all cases and, in terms of standard deviations, its magnitude ranges from
16% increase for “use or threaten to use a weapon” to roughly 55% for “get into a serious physical
ﬁght”. Not surprisingly, the inﬂuence of friends is stronger for the latter type of crime than the
former.23 The analysis on the education data has also been performed using as dependent variables
mathematics, history and social studies, and science scores separately. Although the impact of
the Bonacich measure is much smaller when using mathematics score only, the eﬀects measured in
terms of standard deviations are never smaller than 27%.
This evidence provides a powerful test of our theoretical model on the network structure of peer
eﬀects. The important insight of this empirical investigation is that, as predicted by the theoretical
model, the network structure of friendship relations seems to play a central role in shaping individual
decisions and therefore it has to be incorporated into empirical and/or theoretical models seeking
to investigate individuals’ behavior. It seems also that the magnitude of peer and network eﬀects
are stronger in crime than in education. This is not surprising since it is well-established that crime
is, to some extent, a group phenomenon, and the source of crime and delinquency is located in the
intimate social networks of individuals (see e.g. Sutherland, 1947, Warr, 2002, Calvó-Armengol
and Zenou, 2004). Instead, school behavior, although partly subject to peer pressure, is also driven
by the institutional role of the school.
It is useful to discuss our results with that of Haynie (2001), who has previously analyzed
the delinquency-peer association using Bonacich centrality with the AddHealth database. Her
analysis, though, does not follow from an equilibrium analysis, nor does the estimation use ﬁrst-
order conditions. This entails two main diﬀerences with respect to our paper. First, her analysis
does not restrict to the network of delinquents. The sampled networks mix both delinquents and
23This is also consistent with the indirect inference on the role of social interactions in diﬀerent type of criminal
activities provided in Glaeser et al. (1996).
24non-delinquents adolescent, and centrality in this larger network can hardly be interpreted as a
proxy for peer eﬀects. Second, across network variations are not used, and the parameter of dyadic
peer strength is ﬁxed (arbitrarily) constant at 0.1 for all networks. For this reason, the role of
structural location in explaining outcomes is not very diﬀerent than the one delivered by other
arbitrary measures of network location (like for example the betweenness centrality measure that
we describe in the next section).
4.4 An alternative measure of network centrality: betweenness
Our model of network interactions points at the Bonacich centrality as the relevant network measure
to account for observed criminal and educational outcomes. Over the past years, social network
theorists have proposed a number of centrality measures to account for the variability in network
location across agents (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Roughly, these indices encompass two dimen-
sions of centrality, connectivity and betweenness. The simplest index of connectivity is the number
of direct links stemming from each node in the network. Instead, betweenness indexes derive from
the number of optimal paths across (or from) every node.24 Bonacich centrality is an index of
connectivity since it counts the number of any path stemming from a given node, not just optimal
paths.25 While these measures are mainly geometric in nature, our theory provides a behavioral
foundation to the Bonacich centrality measure (and only this one) that coincides with the unique
Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative peer eﬀects game on a social network.
For robustness check, we test the explanatory value of an alternative centrality measure. We
use betweenness centrality. This is a very popular network measure that, to our knowledge, lacks
any behavioral (nor axiomatic) grounding. Freeman (1978/79) deﬁnes the betweenness centrality




# of shortest paths between j and l through i in gκ
# of shortest paths between j and l in gκ
Friendships networks are, by deﬁnition, undirected networks, where relationships are reciprocal,




(nκ − 1)(nκ − 2)/2
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where nκ is the size of the network component gκ.
We estimate model (7) using this measure of betweenness. Note that betweenness is a parameter-
free network measure, and only one stage of estimation is required (second stage of our empirical
analysis). The results are given in Table 4.
24See Freeman (1978/79) for an example of betweenness centrality, equal to the mean of the shortest-path distance
between some given node and all other nodes that can be reached in the network.
25See Borgatti (2003) for a discussion on the lack of a systematic criterium to pick up the “right” network centrality
measure for each particular situation.
25[Insert Table 4 here]
The normalized betweenness measure f∗
i has a mean equal to 0.43 and a standard deviation
equal to 0.49 for crime, whereas its mean and standard deviations are equal to 0.45 and 0.51 for
education. Looking at the responsiveness of our dependent variables, the estimation results in
Table 4 reveal that a standard deviation increase in the betweenness measure raises the level of
individual delinquency and school performance by only 11% and 9% respectively. The magnitude
of these eﬀects is four times smaller than the estimated impact of the Bonacich centrality measure,
evaluated to 45% for crime and 34% education.
There are two main explanations for the discrepancy in the explanatory power of betweenness
centrality versus that of Bonacich centrality.
The ﬁrst reason is that the unique Nash equilibrium of a peer eﬀects game is described exactly by
the Bonacich centrality network measure. Bonacich centrality is not an arbitrary network measure
to try and describe the structural role of network positioning on individual behavior in the presence
of local complementarities. Rather, it results from a positive analysis that maps network topology
to equilibrium behavior. The closed-form expression of this mapping gives rise exactly to an aﬃne
transformation of Bonacich centrality. Instead, to our knowledge, betweenness centrality lacks any
behavioral nor axiomatic grounding. It is just an ad hoc choice for a network measure to try and
grasp how topology shapes behavior, with no a priori connection with the sort of complementarities
in decisions characteristic of peer eﬀects.
The second reason is that betweenness centrality is a parameter-free network index. It only
depends on the network geometry. Instead, Bonacich centrality depends both on the network
topology and on the prevailing peer eﬀect strength inside the group under consideration. Consider
a group of agents connected through a network. Fix the average intra-group externality for this
group of agents to a certain level. Bonacich centrality keeps track of the relative exposure of
every group member to this average inﬂuence of the group as a whole. By so doing, the Bonacich
centrality distributes unevenly this intra-group average externality across group members. Two
agents holding interchangeable locations in two networks with identical geometry but diﬀerent
value for the corresponding average intra-group externality are thus assigned diﬀerent Bonacich
centralities. Instead, these two agents have identical betweenness index. betweenness centrality
depends only on the network geometry, but not on the strength of the average peer eﬀect. As such,
it leads to the same values for two networks with identical geometric structure even though these
networks may be connecting diﬀerent people, more or less inﬂuenced by peer pressure. In other
words, betweenness centrality only reﬂects within-network variations, whereas Bonacich centrality
captures both within-network structural variations, and across-networks group diﬀerences.
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28Appendix 1: Description of control variables
Individual socio-demographic variables
female: dummy variable taking value one if the respondent is female.
race dummies: white, black or African American, other races
age: respondents’ age measured in years.
health status: response to the question "In the last month, how often did a health or emotional
problem cause you to miss a day of school", coded as 0= never, 1=just a few times, 2= about once
a week, 3= almost every day, 4= every day.
religion practice: response to the question: "In the past 12 months, how often did you attend
religious services", coded as 0= not applicable, 1= never, 2= less than once a month, 3= once a
month or more, but less than once a week, 4= once a week or more.
school attendance: number or years the respondent has been a student at the school.
student grade: grade of student in the current year.
mathematics score: score in mathematics at the most recent grading period, coded as1= D or
lower, 2= C, 3=B, 4=A.
organized social participation: dummy taking value one if the respondent participate in any
clubs, organizations, or teams at school in the school year.
motivation in education: dummy taking value one if the respondent reports to try very hard to
do his/her school work well, coded as 1=I never try at all, 2=I don’t try very hard, 3=I try hard
enough, but not as hard as I could, 4=I try very hard to do my best.
self esteem: response to the question: "Compared with other people your age, how intelligent
are you", coded 1as = moderately below average, 2= slightly below average, 3= about average, 4=
slightly above average, 5= moderately above average, 6= extremely above average.
physical development: response to the question: "How advanced is your physical development
compared to other boys your age", coded as 1= I look younger than most, 2= I look younger than
some, 3= I look about average, 4= I look older than some, 5= I look older than most.
Family background variables
household size: number of people living in the household.
public assistance: dummy taking value one if either the father or the mother receives public
assistance, such as welfare.
mother working: dummy taking value one if the mother works for pay.
two married parent family: dummy taking value one if the respondent lives in a household with
two parents (both biological and non biological) that are married.
single parent family: dummy taking value one if the respondent lives in a household with only
one parents (both biological and non biological).
parent education: schooling of (biological or non-biological) parent that is living with the child,
coded as 1=never went to school, 2= not graduate from high school, 3= high school graduate,
294=graduated from college or a university, 5= professional training beyond a four-year college. If
both parents are in the household, the education of the father is considered.
parents age: mean value of the age of the parents (biological or non-biological) living with the
child.
parent occupation dummies: closest description of the job of (biological or non-biological) parent
that is living with the child, coded as 6-category dummies (doesn’t work without being disables,
the reference group, manager, professional or technical, oﬃce or sales worker, manual, military or
security, farm or ﬁshery, retired, other). If both parents are in the household, the occupation of
the father is considered.
Protective factors
parental care: dummy taking value one if the respondent reports that the (biological or non-
biological) parent that is living with her/him or at least one of the parents if both are in the
household cares very much about her/him.
relationship with teachers: dummy taking value one if the respondent reports to have trouble
getting along with teachers at least about once a week, since the beginning of the school year.
school attachment: composite score of three items derived from the questions: "How much do
you agree or disagree that a) You feel close to people at your school, b) you feel like you are part
of your school, c) you are happy to be at your school", all coded as 1= strongly agree, 2= agree,
3=neither agree nor disagree, 4= disagree, 5= strongly disagree. (Crombach-alpha =0.75).
social exclusion: response to the question: "How much do you feel that adults care about you,
coded as 1= very much, 2= quite a bit, 3= somewhat, 4= very little, 5= not at all.
Global social interaction variables
friend attachment: dummy taking value one if the respondent reports that he/she feels that
his/her friends cares very much about him/her
friend involvement: response to the question: "During the past week, how many times did you
just hang out with friends", coded as 0= not at all, 1=1 or 2 times, 2=3 or 4 times, 3=5 or more
times.
friend contacts: composite score of the values averaged on all nominated friends of the items
derived from the questions: "Did you a) go to nominated friend (NF)’s house during the past
seven days, b) meet NF after school to hang out or go somewhere during the past seven days,
c) spend time with NF during the past weekend, d) talk to NF about a problem during the past
seven days, e) talk to NF on the telephone during the past seven days, all coded as 1=yes, 0=no.
(Crombach-alpha =0.84)
L o c a ls o c i a li n t e r a c t i o n sv a r i a b l e s
strength of local interactions: composite score of the values averaged on direct friends only of
the items listed in the description of friend contact. (Crombach-alpha =0.86).
quality of local interactions: average value across direct friends of mathematics score.
30quality of local interactions (background): average value across direct friends of parent educa-
tion.
protective factors of local interactions: composite scores of average value across direct friends
of school attachment, parental care, friend attachment, social exclusion. (Crombach-alpha =0.72).
local average delinquency: average value across direct friends of delinquency index
Residential neighborhood variables
neighborhood quality: interviewer response to the question "How well kept are most of the
buildings on the street", coded as 1= very poorly kept (needs major repairs), 2= poorly kept
(needs minor repairs), 3= fairly well kept (needs cosmetic work), 4= very well kept.
residential building quality: interviewer response to the question "How well kept is the building
in which the respondent lives", coded as 1= very poorly kept (needs major repairs), 2= poorly kept
(needs minor repairs), 3= fairly well kept (needs cosmetic work), 4= very well kept.
neighborhood safety: dummy variable taking value if the interviewer felt concerned for his/her
safety when he/she went to the respondent’s home.
residential area type: interviewer’s description of the immediate area or street (one block,
both sides) where the respondent lives, coded as 5-category dummies (rural, the reference group,
suburban, urban - residential only, 3 or more commercial properties - mostly retail, 3 or more
commercial properties - mostly wholesale or industrial, other).
School variables
teachers quality: percentage of full-time classroom teachers holding Master’s degree of higher.
school quality: ratio between full-time classroom teachers and average class size.
school type dummies: catholic or other private with religious aﬃliation, private with no religious
aﬃliation, public (reference group), other.
students quality: number of students retained in the same grade for the next academic year
(averaged on all grades and total amount of students held back if the school is ungraded).
strictness of school anti-crime regulations: composite score of the items derived from the ques-
tions: ”In your school, what happens to a student who is caught: a) injuring another student,
b) possessing alcohol, c) possessing an illegal drug, d) possessing a weapon, e) drinking alcohol
at school, f) using an illegal drug at school, g) verbally abusing a teacher, h) physically injuring
a teacher, i) stealing school property”, coded as 1= no policy, verbal warning or minor actions,
2= in-school suspension (the student does not attend classes, but comes to school), 3= out-of-
school suspension (the student must stay out of school for a time), 4= expulsion (the student must
withdraw permanently). (Crombach-alpha 0.74).
31TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS on the CRIME DATA SET (5,154 criminals; 116 networks) 
 
 Mean  St.dev  Min  Max 
      
female  0.23 0.30  0 1 
age  14.82 1.69  10 19 
health status  2.10 1.61  0 4 
religion practice  1.51 0.71  0 4 
black or African American  0.24 0.35  0 1 
other races  0.05 0.06  0 1 
school attendance  2.99 1.26  1 6 
student grade  8.51 1.84  6 13 
mathematics score  1.18 1.29  1 4 
organized social participation  0.67 0.26  0 1 
motivation in education:  1.87 0.77  1 4 
relationship with teachers:  0.29 0.41  0 1 
social exclusion:  3.37 1.72  1 5 
school attachment  3.85 1.21  1 5 
parental care  0.41 0.45  0 1 
household size  4.52 1.16  1 6 
two married parent family  0.30 0.35  0 1 
single parent family  0.32 0.36  0 1 
public assistance:  0.25 0.31  0 1 
Mother working  0.54 0.44  0 1 
parent education  3.19 1.66  1 5 
parents age  42.31 7.81  33 75 
parent occupation manager  0.09 0.11  0 1 
parent occupation professional or technical  0.11 0.16  0 1 
parent occupation office or sales worker  0.17 0.19  0 1 
parent occupation manual  0.32 0.40  0 1 
parent occupation military or security  0.06 0.07  0 1 
parent occupation farm or fishery  0.01 0.02  0 1 
parent occupation retired  0.04 0.08  0 1 
parent occupation other  0.09 0.10  0 1 
neighborhood quality  1.95 2.41  1 4 
residential building quality  1.57 1.77  1 4 
neighborhood safety  0.45 0.57  0 1 
residential area type suburban  0.27 0.30  0 1 
residential area type urban - residential only  0.10 0.12  0 1 
residential area type 3 or more commercial 
properties - mostly retail 
0.15 0.17  0 1 
residential area type 3 or more commercial 
properties - mostly wholesale or industrial 
0.20 0.28  0 1 
residential area type other  0.18 0.23  0 1 
friend attachment:  0.45 0.47  0 1 
friend involvement:  2.40 1.10  0 3 
friend contacts  0.88 0.10  0 1 
physical development  3.06 2.34  1 5 
self esteem  3.81 1.18  1 6 
school catholic or other private, religious 
affiliation 
0.09 0.17  0 1 
school private, no religious affiliation  0.02 0.14  0 1 
school quality  2.25  3.32 0.7 4.78 
students quality  491.13 205.01  142.43  856.64 
teachers quality  49.29 24.41  0 100 
strictness of school anti-crime regulations  2.11 1.75  1 4 TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS on the EDUCATION DATA SET (11,964 pupils; 199 networks) 
 
 Mean  St.dev  Min  Max 
       
female  0.41 0.35  0 1 
age  15.29 1.85  10 19 
health status  3.01 1.77  0 4 
religion practice  2.71 0.77  0 4 
black or African American  0.20 0.31  0 1 
other races  0.12 0.15  0 1 
school attendance  3.28 1.86  1 6 
student grade  9.27 3.11  6 13 
delinquency index  0.52 2.25  0 3 
mathematics score  1,99 1,33  1 4 
organized social participation  0.62 0.22  0 1 
motivation in education:  2.23 0.88  1 4 
relationship with teachers:  0.12 0.34  0 1 
social exclusion:  2.26 1.81  1 5 
school attachment  2.59 1.76  1 5 
parental care  0.69 0.34  0 1 
household size  3.52 1.71  1 6 
two married parent family  0.41 0.57  0 1 
single parent family  0.23 0.44  0 1 
public assistance:  0.12 0.16  0 1 
mother working  0.65 0.47  0 1 
parent education  3.69 2.06  1 5 
parents age  40.12 13.88  33 75 
parent occupation manager  0.11 0.13  0 1 
parent occupation professional or technical  0.09 0.21  0 1 
parent occupation office or sales worker  0.26 0.29  0 1 
parent occupation manual  0.21 0.32  0 1 
parent occupation military or security  0.09 0.12  0 1 
parent occupation farm or fishery  0.04 0.09  0 1 
parent occupation retired  0.06 0.09  0 1 
parent occupation other  0.11 0.16  0 1 
neighborhood quality  2.99 2.02  1 4 
residential building quality  2.95 1.85  1 4 
neighborhood safety  0.51 0.57  0 1 
residential area type suburban  0.32 0.38  0 1 
residential area type urban - residential only  0.18 0.21  0 1 
residential area type 3 or more commercial 
properties - mostly retail 
0.12 0.15  0 1 
residential area type 3 or more commercial 
properties - mostly wholesale or industrial 
0.13 0.18  0 1 
residential area type other  0.19 0.25  0 1 
friend attachment:  0.49 0.54  0 1 
friend involvement:  1.88 1.56  0 3 
friend contacts  0.89 0.12  0 1 
physical development  3.14 2.55  1 5 
self esteem  3.93 1.33  1 6 
school catholic or other private. religious 
affiliation 
0.19 0.24  0 1 
school private. no religious affiliation  0.14 0.19  0 1 
school quality  2.45 3.53  0.5  4.89 
students quality  412.77  240.78 140.32 864.12 
teachers quality  54.12 26.53  0 100 
strictness of school anti-crime regulations  2.21 1.89  1 4 TABLE 3: MODEL (7) ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 







    
Bonacich measure  0.3765** (0.1130)  0.2808*** (0.0929) 
female  -0.1322**(0.0623) 0.0911**(0.0404) 
age  0.0723 (0.1091)  0.0224 (0.0665) 
health status  0.0912 (0.2121)  -0.1055 (0.1919) 
religion practice  -0.1402***(0.0165) 0.0751  (0.0645) 
black or African American  0.1005 (0.0884)  -0.0792* (0.0522) 
other races  0.0155 (0.0505)  0.1450*** (0.0323) 
school attendance  0.1193 (0.2020)  0.0791 (0.1011) 
student grade  -0.0374 (0.0466)  0.0866*** (0.0222) 
mathematics score  -0.1655***(0.0043) 0.1889**(0.0886) 
delinquency index  - -0.2922***(0.0624) 
organized social participation  0.0048 (0.1239)  0.0911** (0.0067) 
motivation in education:  -0.3422***(0.0012) 0.8825***(0.1002) 
household size  0.0021 (0.0019)  -0.0011 (0.0018) 
two married parent family  -0.4439***(0.0045) 0.4350  (0.2255) 
single parent family  0.2554 (0.1704)  -0.5224*** (0.2027) 
public assistance:  0.8625***(0.1558) -0.3122*  (0.  0.2028) 
mother working  0.0073 (0.1901)  0.1575 (0.1413) 
parent education  -0.1100** (0.0523)  0.3207*** (0.0779) 
parents age  0.0002 (0.1442)  0.0005 (0.1350) 
parent occupation manager  -0.0222 (0.4332)  -0.0105 (0.2683) 
parent occupation professional or 
technical 
-0.0303 (0.5215)  -0.0134 (0.2750) 
parent occupation office or sales worker  0.0101 (0.1312)  0.0089 (0.1623) 
parent occupation manual  0.0961 (0.0808)  -0.0999** (0.0471) 
parent occupation military or security  -0.0552 (0.2291)  0.0117 (0.1298) 
parent occupation farm or fishery  0.0202 (0.4051)  -0.0779 (0.4015) 
parent occupation retired  0.0095 (0.2265)  0.1633 (0.1772) 
parent occupation other  0.0299 (0.2040)  0.0125 (0.3041) 
relationship with teachers  0.2710 (0.2752)  -0.6723***  (0.2258) 
social exclusion:  0.0566 (0.4561)  -0.4559** (0.2053) 
school attachment  0.0409**(0.0206) -0.1975**(0.0982) 
parental care  -0.2699***(0.0219) 0.7142***(0.0915) 
neighborhood quality  -0.0521 (0.3747)  0.0066 (0.1140) 
residential building quality  -0.1052**(0.0531) 0.1925***(0.0678) 
neighborhood safety  1.0084***(0.4101) 0.7228  (0.7940) 
residential area type suburban  0.1111 (0.5643)  -0.0451 (0.2186) 
residential area type urban - residential 
only 
-0.0445 (0.4499)  0.2730*** (0.0333) 
residential area type 3 or more 
commercial properties - mostly retail 
0.0455 (0.6551)  0.0052 (0.3055) 
residential area type 3 or more 
commercial properties - mostly 
wholesale or industrial 
0.0912 (0.7806)  -0.0594 (0.3108) 
residential area type other  -0.0065 (0.4120)  0.0085 (0.0955) 
school catholic or other private. religious 
affiliation 
-0.0399 (0.0388)  0.3431*** (0.0102) 
school private. no religious affiliation  -0.0355 (0.0299)  0.3021(0.3553) 
school quality  -0.0707 (0.0775)  -0.1655** (0.0834) 
students quality  -0.0020 (0.0256)  0.0062 (0.1220) 
teachers quality  -0.0165 (0.0211)  0.0350*** (0.0009) 
strictness of school anti-crime 
regulations 
-0.3903 (0.3954)  0.1290** (0.0608) 
friend attachment:  -0.1656** (0.0832)  -0.0019 (0.1211) 
friend involvement:  0.1224** (0.0556)  -0.2231** (0.0991) 
friend contacts  0.6441 (0.5974)  0.6905 (0.5997) 
strength of local interactions  0.6505**(0.3252) 0.1293**(0.0585) 
quality of local interactions  -0.1505** (0.0681)  0.1267*** (0.0105) quality of local interactions (family 
background) 
-0.0888* (0.0592)  0.1944** (0.0849) 
protective factors of local interactions  -0.1284***(0.0239) 0.0682  (0.0877) 
physical development  0.1111 ** (0.0558)  0.1520 (0.2107) 
self esteem  0.2019 ***(0.0535)  0.0716***(0.0281) 
School dummies  Yes yes 
    
R
2  .5315 .5464 
Notes:   White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the network level are reported in parentheses. 
One, two, three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
Regressions are weighted to population proportions. 
Number of observations column two: 597,864 (5,154 criminals; 116 networks). 
Number of observations column three: 2,380,836  (11,964 pupils; 199 networks). 
 TABLE 4: MODEL (7) ESTIMATION RESULTS 
 







    
betweeness measure  0.3998**(0.1781) 0.3585**  (0.1697 
female  -0.1325** (0.0701)  0.0948**(0.429) 
age  0.1100 (0.1122)  0.0479 (0.0598) 
health status  0.1799 (0.2654)  -0.0788 (0.1133) 
religion practice  -0.2152*** (0.0122)  0.0651 (0.0512) 
black or African American  0.1218 (0.1031)  -0.0954* (0.0345) 
other races  0.0577 (0.0565)  0.1569*** (0.0571) 
school attendance  0.1923 (0.2131)  0.1007 (0.1011) 
student grade  -0.0478**(0.0222) 0.0680***  (0.0100) 
mathematics score  -0.2215*** (0.0156)  0.2555*** (0.0555) 
delinquency index  - -0.4909***(0.1055) 
organized social participation  *0.0131 (0.0081)  0.0110** (0.0052) 
motivation in education:  -0.4076***(0.0055) 0.8112***(0.0666) 
household size  0.0020** (0.0009)  -0.0013 (0.0099) 
two married parent family  -0.4575***(0.0023) 0.5065  (0.4595) 
single parent family  0.3811**(0.1432) -0.5469***(0.1454) 
public assistance:  0.7990***(0.1991) -0.2992*  (0.1899) 
mother working  0.0101 (0.1563)  0.1510 (0.1155) 
parent education  -0.1640***(0.0091) 0.3101***  (0.0654) 
parents age  0.0009 (0.1288)  0.0007 (0.1445) 
parent occupation manager  -0.0344 (0.4278)  -0.0129 (0.2428) 
parent occupation 
professional or technical 
-0.0324 (0.5321)  -0.0055 (0.2650) 
parent occupation office or 
sales worker 
0.0099 (0.1657)  0.0127 (0.2861) 
parent occupation manual  0.1010**(0.0459) -0.0095**  (0.0043) 
parent occupation military or 
security 
-0.0189 (0.1787)  0.0421 (0.1342) 
parent occupation farm or 
fishery 
0.0332 (0.4041)  -0.0991 (0.4143) 
parent occupation retired  0.0256 (0.2516)  0.1431 (0.1321) 
parent occupation other  0.0239 (0.2114)  0.0254 (0.3244) 
relationship with teachers:  0.3031 (0.2042)  -0.7439***(0.2955) 
social exclusion:  0.0499 (0.1399)  -0.3949** (0.1881) 
school attachment  0.10779***(0.0299) -0.1865**(0.0875) 
parental care  -0.2974***(0.0169) 0.6947***(0.1099) 
neighborhood quality  -0.0542 (0.4255)  0.0094 (0.1143) 
residential building quality  -0.0876** (0.0394)  0.1912***(0.0710) 
neighborhood safety  1.0220***(0.4005) 0.7859  (0.7439) 
residential area type suburban  0.1237 (0.5695)  -0.0121 (0.1908) 
residential area type urban - 
residential only 
-0.0541 (0.4578)  0.3105*** (0.0334) 
residential area type 3 or 
more commercial properties - 
mostly retail 
0.0652 (0.6655)  0.0044 (0.3615) 
residential area type 3 or 
more commercial properties - 
mostly wholesale or 
industrial 
0.0783 (0.7592)  -0.0915 (0.2778) 
residential area type other  -0.0053 (0.4885)  0.0095 (0.0514) 
school catholic or other 
private. religious affiliation 
-0.0541***(0.0045) 0.3431***  (0.0231) 
school private. no religious 
affiliation 
-0.0129***(0.0077) 0.3454  (0.3431) 
school quality  -0.0678(0.0679) -0.1651**  (0.0743) 
students quality  -0.0010 (0.0263)  0.0029 (0.1066) 
teachers quality  -0.0198 (0.0158)  0.0606*** (0.0021) 
strictness of school anti-crime  0.4312**(0.2043) 0.1293**  (0.0601) regulations 
friend attachment:  -0.1699**(0.0764) -0.0010  (0.0998) 
friend involvement:  0.1354**(0.0609) -0.2231**  (0.1103) 
friend contacts  0.4956  (0.3998)  0.6504 (0.5971) 
strength of local interactions  0.6627**(0.3030) 0.1349**(0.0607) 
quality of local interactions  -0.1349** (0.0679)  0.1265*** (0.0065) 
quality of local interactions 
(background) 
-0.1475** (0.0705)  0.1430** (0.0644) 
protective factors of local 
interactions 
-0.0911**(0.0414) 0.0778  (0.0788) 
physical development  0.1399*** (0.0505)  0.1702 (0.1575) 
self esteem  0.2123***(0.0547) 0.1430***(0.0342) 
School dummies  yes yes 
    
R
2  .5116 .4777 
Notes:   White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the network level are reported in parentheses. 
One, two, three asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent respectively. 
Regressions are weighted to population proportions. 
Number of observations column two: 597,864 (5,154 criminals; 116 networks). 
Number of observations column three: 2,380,836  (11,964 pupils; 199 networks). 
 